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BAR BRIEFS
COMMENT
Case Note, Ex Parte Chambers.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW EXECUTIVE POWERS
POWERS RESTRICTIONS ON PARDONING POWERS.

LEGISLATIVE

-

In 1936, by
virtue of an initiated measure, "engaging in the liquor traffic"
ceased to be a crime. In 1937, petitioner was found guilty of the
crime of engaging in the liquor traffic, the offense having occurred in 1935. He was thereafter sentenced to the state peni-.
tentiary. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court, 280
N. W. 196., and the Supreme Court of the United States dismissed
his appeal to it on April 10, 1939, 59 Sup. Ct. 588, so that, thereupon, he was committed to the penitentiary. A petition to the
District Court for a writ of habeas corpus was denied, and application to the Supreme Court followed. N. D. Comp. Laws 1913,
Sec. 7316, saves the penalty for violation of a law prior to its repeal. Such section was amended by Chap. 134, Laws of 1939, effective March 18, 1939, so that prison sentences imposed for violation of a repealed law should be extinguished, unless otherwise
provided in the repealing act. Petitioner contends that, therefore, after March 18, 1939, he was in the same position as if the
law, for the violation of which he had been tried, had been repealed without any saving statute having been in effect. Petitioner further contends that on such date his appeal was pending,
and that no court could henceforth compel compliance with the
judgment and sentence. The state claims that the act is unconstitutional, as applied to petitioner, in that it operates as a pardon
by the legislature, whereas the pardoning power is vested exclusively in the Governor and the Board of Pardons. N. D. Const.
Art. 76, as amended by Art. 3. Held, that Chap. 134, Laws of
1939, was, as far as extinguishing petitioner's sentence is concerned, an exercise by the legislature of the pardoning power
granted to the Governor and the Board of Pardons, exclusively,
except in case of treason or impeachment. Ex Parte Chambers,
(N. D.) 285 N. W. 862 (1939)
-

"The pardoning power is neither inherently nor necessarily
an executive power, but is a power of government inherent in the
people, who may by constitutional provision place its exercise in
any official board or department of government they choose.
Jameson v. Flanner, 116 Kans. 624, 228 Pac. 82 (1924). The
people had the right to withhold all power from any one of the
three branches; or, on the other hand, they had the right to vest
the pardoning power in either the legislature or the judicial
branches of the government. The executive no more represents
the sovereignty of the state than either one of the other branches
of the state government. The pardoning power no more vests in
the governor, by virtue of his position, than it does in the judicial
branch of the government when the constitution is silent." State
v. Nichols, 26 Ark. 74 (1870). In the case under consideration,
the court held that the act in question was an unconstitutional
usurpation of the exclusive executive power to grant pardons
"after conviction," but the decision indicated that the meaning
of the words "after conviction" is not settled and varies in different jurisdictions. In the instant case, the court declared that it
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was immaterial whether it meant "after a verdict of guilty" or
"after judgment and sentence," and that in either event the act
in question was an exercise of legislative clemency "after conviction." The N. Y. Const. Art. 2, Sec. 2, provides that a "person
convicted" of an infamous crime shall forfeit the privilege of suffrage. The court, considering the proposition in People v. Fabian,
192 N. Y. 443, 85 N. E. 672 (1908), declared that the term "convicted" did not apply in a case where there had been a verdict of
guilty, but sentence had been suspended without judgment. The
instant case was still pending on appeal when Chap. 134 of the
Laws of 1939 was enacted.
There is a difference of opinion as to the authority of a legislative body to grant pardons. The matter is ably discussed pro
and con in "Legislative Pardons" (1939), 27 Cal. L. R. 371. In
that article, while differing on the subject of legislative pardons,
the exponents of either view indicated that the legislature is empowered to grant amnesties. The point was not raised in the
Chambers case. Is it possible that Chap. 134, Laws of 1939, was
in the nature of an amnesty? An amnesty has been defined as
"a general pardon, an act pertaining to a multitude without consideration of the special circumstances of individual cases."
Generally, a pardon remits punishment to a specific person,
whereas an amnesty remits punishment for a specific crime.
N. D. Const., Art. 76, as amended by Art. 3, vests the power to
pardon after conviction in the Governor and the Board of
Pardons, but the Constitution is silent on the subject of amnesty.
A sovereign state has all powers not delegated to the Federal
Government, or expressly prohibited by its own Constitution or
the Federal Constitution. North Dakota is a sovereign state.
The power to grant an amnesty for violation of a state law has
not been delegated to the Federal Government. Neither is it expressly prohibited by the Federal Constitution or the State Constitution. Therefore, does the power to grant an amnesty not lie
in the sovereign State of North Dakota? If it does, in the absence
of mention of the subject in the State Constitution, may the
legislature exercise that power?
There was a social reason back of the enactment of Chap.
134, Laws of 1939. What had formerly been the crime of "engaging in the liquor traffic" was now a legitimate commercial
enterprise. It was generally understood that numerous persons
had engaged in the liquor traffic. Might not the legislature have
deemed it socially inexpedient to impose imprisonment for acts
no longer generally considered to involve moral turpitude or
statutory infringement?
If such were the intent of the legislature, is there a difference under the Constitution of North Dakota between a pardon to a specific person and an act which releases all persons within a designated group from imprisonment?
CYRUS N. LYNCHE.
University of North Dakota.
LAW SCHOOL NOTES
The School of Law of the University of North Dakota began
its forty-first year September 19, 1939. The enrollment for the
first semester of this year is 71 and the enrollment for the first

